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I. Introduction
Learning disabled people make up one of the fastest growing segments of
the law student population. Between 1990 and 1993, for example, the number
of learning disabled individuals taking the LSAT under special conditions
(usually consisting of time extensions) increased by over 100 percent, from
261 to 553.1 In the 1994-95 testing year, Law Services received 785 requests
from learning disabled individuals for similar accommodations. 2 Many of to-
day's law students have known of their learning disabilities since their elemen-
tary school days in the 1960's and 70's, when educators became increasingly
aware of such disabilities and began to administer tests to detect them. 3 Others
* Lecturer, West Virginia University College of Law. J.D., Duke Law School, 1990. The author would
like to thank Dean Teree Foster and Profs. Grace Wigal and Carl Selinger for their helpful comments on this
article.
1. Linda F. Wrightman, Test Takers with Disabilities: A Summary of Data from Special Administra-
tions of the LSAT 11-12 (1993) in LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL RESEARCH REPORT 93-05 11-12
(1993) (available from Law Services, Newtown, Pennsylvania). These numbers represent only a small per-
centage of the total administrations of the LSAT. In 1989-90, only .25 percent of LSAT takers received
accommodations for learning disabilities. In 1992-93, this figure rose to approximately .4 percent. Id. at
12-13.
2. Information provided by Marion Doxey, Test Administration Associate, Law Services, Newtown,
Pennsylvania, August 1995. For statistics regarding learning disabled students at the undergraduate level,
see Susan A. Vogel, A Retrospective and Prospective View of Postsecondary Education for Adults with
Learning Disabilities, in SUCCESS FOR COLLEGE STUDENTS WITH LEARNING DISABILITIES, 3 & 7 (Susan A.
Vogel & Pamela B. Adelman eds., 1993); STEPHEN T. MURPHY, ON BEING L.D.: PERSPECTIVES AND
STRATEGIES OF YOUNG ADULTS 3 (1992).
3. M. Kay Runyan and Joseph F. Smith, Jr., Identifying and Accommodating Learning Disabled Law
School Students, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 317, 320 (1991); Stan F. Shaw et al., College and University Program-
32 Journal of Law & Education
have not known of their disabilities until their entry into law school, where the
curriculum is often much more rigorous than at the undergraduate level. The
story of a learning disabled law student interviewed by Stephen T. Murphy is
not unusual. He reports success as an undergraduate, but notes,
When I got to law school, things sort of reversed about 180 degrees, and I
had a lot of trouble my first year. It seemed to me the trouble was not so
much knowing what was going on or not knowing what to put down, but
getting it down on paper.... [After being diagnosed as learning disabled,]
I wasn't surprised, but if someone had told me that I had a learning disa-
bility, say, at the end of my sophomore year of college, I'd have said,
"There's no way," because my grades were very good. 4
The Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act, 5 and its previous incar-
nations, 6 have required public schools to provide special services to learning
disabled students in kindergarten through high school to allow them to com-
plete educational programs successfully. Many students who have received
these services have graduated from public school and are now going on to
college. 7 Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 8 and Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 9 colleges and universities are prohibited
from discriminating against qualified students with learning disabilities and
must reasonably accommodate such disabilities so that students have a genu-
ine opportunity to complete academic programs successfully. Consequently,
many universities are becoming experienced at assisting learning disabled stu-
dents, and college guides are now available to help such students choose uni-
versities and even graduate schools that will best meet their needs. 10
ming, in LEARNING DISABILITIES IN ADULTHOOD: PERSISTING PROBLEMS AND EVOLVING ISSUES 141, 142
(Paul J. Gerber & Henry B. Reiff eds., 1994). For further discussion of the history of the field of learning
disabilities research, see Murphy, supra note 2, at 1-4.
4. MURPHY, supra note 2, at 33.
5. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (1990 & Supp. 1995).
6. A previous version of this legislation was entitled the Education for All Handicapped Children Act
of 1975.
7. During the 1980's, the number of voluntarily self-identifying college students with learning disa-
bilities increased tenfold. In fact, at least 1.3% of college freshmen had learning disabilities in 1987. NA-
TIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUCATION, PROFILES OF HANDICAPPED
STUDENTS IN POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION (1987). Providers of services for learning disabled students in the
Washington, D.C., area report that since that time, the numbers have continued to increase, leading to over-
whelming numbers of requests for special services. Vogel, supra note 2, at 7.
8. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 et seq. (West Supp. 1995).
9. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West Supp. 1995).
10. See, e.g., A.J. SCLAFANI & MJ. LYNCH, COLLEGE GUIDE FOR STUDENTS WITH LEARNING DISABILI-
TIES (1988); C. T. STRAUGHN, II, Lovejoy's College Guide for the Learning Disabled (2d ed. 1988); N.
Blackmore et al., LEARNING DISABILITIES AT HARVARD: A PAMPHLET WRrITEN BY STUDENTS WITH LEARN-
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Not surprisingly, just like their non-disabled peers, a number of learning
disabled college graduates are choosing to enter professions such as law and
medicine. Their entry into professional schools has raised a number of legal
issues concerning their qualification to matriculate, their need for accommoda-
tions, and their eventual ability to practice successfully. This article will dis-
cuss each of these issues in the specific context of legal education after
providing a general explanation of learning disabilities and of the federal stat-
utes governing the rights of learning disabled students.
II. The Nature of Learning Disabilities: A Brief Overview
In layman's terms, a learning disability is a condition that may affect a per-
son's ability to take in information, to remember and process information, or
to communicate information. Dyslexia, a condition that causes difficulty in
reading, is one well-known example of a learning disability, but many more
exist. it Because learning disabilities have been studied by professionals in
many fields, including neurology, psychology, speech pathology, and educa-
tion, no single official clinical definition of such disabilities exists. Neverthe-
less, experts from many fields generally agree upon the following
characteristics of learning disabilities: 12
ING DISABILITIES FOR STUDENTS WITH LEARNING DISABILITIES AT HARVARD (1991) (available from
Harvard University Office of Disability Resources, Cambridge, MA). A number of other general guides to
colleges for learning disabled students are described in Sara Cowen, Transition Planning for LD College-
Bound Students, in SUCCESS FOR COLLEGE STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES, supra note 2, at 39, 53-56.
11. See Runyan & Smith, supra note 3, at 319. For a helpful glossary of terms related to various
learning disabilities, see id. at 341-43.
12. Five of the seven characteristics below are represented in the revised definition of "learning disa-
bilities" developed by the U.S. Interagency Committee on Learning Disabilities in 1987:
Learning disabilities is a generic term that refers to a heterogeneous group of disorders mani-
fested by significant difficulties in the acquisition and use of listening, speaking, reading, writ-
ing, reasoning, or mathematical abilities, or of social skills. These disorders are intrinsic to the
individual and presumed to be due to central nervous system dysfunction. Even though a
learning disability may occur concomitantly with other handicapping conditions (e.g., sensory
impairment, mental retardation, social and emotional disturbance), with socioenvironmental
influences (e.g., cultural differences, insufficient or inappropriate instruction, psychogenic fac-
tors), and especially with attention deficit disorder, all of which may cause learning problems,
a learning disability is not the direct result of those conditions or influences.
LEARNING DISABILITIES: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE 550-551 (J.F. Kavanaugh & T.J.
Truss, eds., 1988). The Interagency Committee was established by the Health Research Extension Act of
1985 (P.L. 99-158) and was charged with reviewing and assessing federal research regarding learning disa-
bilities and with reporting its findings to Congress. Id. at v.
A substantially similar definition, which has garnered wide acceptance in the learning disabilities field,
was proposed by the National Joint Committee on Learning Disabilities in 1988. See Joseph K. Torgesen,
Learning Disabilities Theory: Issues and Advances, in RESEARCH ISSUES IN LEARNING DISABILITIES: THE-
ORY, METHODOLOGY, ASSESSMENT, AND ETHICS 4 (Sharon Vaughn and Candace Bos eds., 1994) (quoting
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(1) Learning disabilities cause significant difficulties in the acquisition and
use of listening, speaking, reading, writing, reasoning, or mathematical
abilities. 13
(2) Learning disabilities are presumed to be caused by central nervous sys-
tem dysfunction. 14
(3) Learning disabled people tend to have average or above average intelli-
gence; is learning disability is not the same as mental retardation. 16
(4) People with learning disabilities have a dramatic discrepancy between
their educational aptitude and their actual educational achievement. 17
(5) People whose aptitude-achievement discrepancies are caused primarily
by visual, hearing, or motor disabilities; mental retardation; emotional distur-
bance; or environmental, cultural, or economic disadvantage are not learning
disabled. 18
(6) Learning disabilities are chronic, although their manifestations may
vary somewhat throughout a person's life. 19
the NJCLD definition). This definition differs from the above-quoted Interagency Committee definition
only in that it emphasizes the chronicity of leaming disabilities, excludes social skills problems from the
category of learning disabilities, and omits any mention of attention deficit disorder. Id.
13. See supra note 12.
14. See generally John E. Obrzut & Anne Uecker, Neuropsychological Theories Associated with
Learning Disorders, in RESEARCH ISSUES IN LEARNING DISABILITIES: THEORY, METHODOLOGY, ASSESS-
MENT, AND ETHICS, supra note 12, at 22; Richard M. Marshall & George W. Hynd, Neurological Basis of
Learning Disabilities, in Learning Disabilities: Best Practices for Professionals 3 (William N. Bender, ed.,
1993); see also Vogel, supra note 2, at 5-6.
15. See Vogel, supra note 2, at 5; Runyan & Smith, supra note 3, at 319; MURPHY, supra note 2, at 6
(discussing criteria used by the Rehabilitation Services Administration to identify learning disabled individ-
uals). However, Bender notes that learning disabled students may have slightly below average IQ's because
most IQ tests include a measurement of language skills. See William N. Bender. Characteristics of Students
with Learning Disabilities, in LEARNING DISABILITIES: BEST PRACTICES FOR INDIVIDUALS supra note 14,
at 1.
16. James D. Sears, Learning Disabilities, Postsecondary Education, and Section 504 of the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973, 12 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 61, 64-66 (1988).
17. J. LERNER, LEARNING DISABILITIES: THEORIES, DIAGNOSIS, AND TEACHtNG STRATEGIES 10- 11 (3d
ed. 1981); CLAYTON E. KELLER & DANIEL P. HALLAHAN, LEARNING DISABILITIES: ISSUES AND INSTRUC-
TIONAL INTERVENTIONS 5 (1987); Joseph F. Smith, Jr. and M. Kay Runyan, How Private Secondary Schools
Can Meet Their Obligations to Accommodate Students with Specific Learning Disabilities, 17 W. NEW ENG.
L. REV. 77, 80 (1995); Runyan & Smith, supra note 3, at 319 (discussing a definitional paper developed for
the use of deans and faculty at the University of California at Berkeley); MURPHY, supra note 2, at 6 (dis-
cussing criteria used by the Rehabilitation Services Administration to identify learning disabled
individuals).
18. Smith & Runyan, supra note 17, at 80.
19. See Vogel, supra note 2, at 4; Laura F. Rothstein, Legal Issues, in SUCCESS FOR COLLEGE STU-
DENTS WITH LEARNING DISABILITIES, supra note 2, at 27 (suggesting that documentation of a learning disa-
bility be updated periodically due to possible changes in the effect of the disability over time).
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(7) People-especially children-with learning disabilities may exhibit be-
havioral abnormalities such as difficulty focusing on a task, 20 inability to get
along with peers, and high levels of impulsive behavior. 21
While the above characteristics represent somewhat of a consensus among
learning disabilities experts, significant debate remains concerning the validity
and usefulness of the label "learning disabled." The term itself is based as
much in politics as it is in science. Samuel Kirk, a special education expert,
coined the term at a conference of concerned parents in 1963. 22 The parents
had organized themselves to lobby for better educational services for their
children, who were not mentally retarded but had difficulty learning. "To gain
public, political, and professional recognition, acceptance, and support for
their cause, they needed a label that was broader than reading or mathematics
disability, different from other mental disabilities, and less stigmatizing than
mental retardation, emotional disturbance, or brain-injured." 23 Kirk's use of
the term "learning disability" met these needs.
Critics have alleged that there are more politics than science at work in the
application of the learning disabled label. While there is growing and increas-
ingly accepted evidence of a link between learning disabilities and neurologi-
cal dysfunction, 24 the existence of such a link has yet to be proven
definitively. 25 Noting this lack of proof, Mehan, Hertweck, and Meihls have
suggested that learning disabilities advocates have mistakenly reified intelli-
gence, educational potential, and academic performance into medical condi-
tions. 26 In addition, Spear and Sternberg have noted further problems with the
learning disabled label: "[W]hereas disabled individuals lack specific abilities,
the converse is not necessarily true; not all individuals who lack specific abili-
ties are learning disabled." 27 Such criticisms have led one expert to conclude
recently that the common trait shared by people labeled learning disabled "is
20. The Foundation for Children with Learning Disabilities and the U.S. Interagency Committee on
Learning Disabilities have pointed out that while attention deficit disorder (ADD) frequently occurs con-
comitantly with learning disabilities, it is not itself a learning disability, and it does not cause learning
disabilities. See Runyan and Smith, supra note 3, at 318 n.7.
21. Bender, supra note 15, at 2; MURPHY, supra note 2, at 13.
22. MURPHY, supra note 2, at 7; LERNER, supra note 17, at 8.
23. MURPHY, supra note 2, at 7.
24. See, e.g., Obrutz & Uecker, supra note 14.
25. See MURPHY, supra note 2, at 8.
26. H. Mehan et al., HANDICAPPING THE HANDICAPPED: DECISION MAKING IN STUDENTS' EDUCA-
TIONAL CAREERS 159-61 (1986).
27. L. Spear & R.J. Sternberg, An Information-Processing Framework for Understanding Learning
Disabilities, in 2 HANDBOOK OF COGNITIVE, SOCIAL, AND NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF LEARNING
DISABILITIES 2, 3 (S. Ceci ed., 1986).
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not so much a set of predictable, measurable biological or behavioral attrib-
utes, but the act of definition itself." 28
Such debates regarding the boundaries and utility of the learning disabled
label have made diagnosis of learning disabilities a complex process. Diagno-
sis is usually performed by psychologists, learning disabilities specialists, or
physicians through a series of tests. Three types of tests are generally used:
intelligence tests, standardized achievement tests, and cognitive batteries that
test spelling, reading, and writing. 29 The results of such tests can help a diag-
nostician determine whether an individual has a noticeable disparity between
intelligence and achievement, and whether the disparity may be caused by a
learning disability. 30
However, because a great variety of people have taken on the role of diag-
nostician, and because these testers use a wide variety of definitions, testing
techniques, and reporting methods, issues often arise as to whether a learning
disability indeed exists and has been adequately documented. 31 Some diagnos-
ticians may, consciously or unconsciously, skew their testing in order to
achieve particular results. Dean Arthur Frakt of the Widener University School
of Law reports, for example, having seen declines of twenty to twenty-five
percent in I.Q. scores when a student is tested by a privately retained diagnos-
tician and then by a neutral or disinterested professional. 32 He suggests that
the elasticity of the learning disabled label has provided "students who are
more desperate than they are disabled [with] grounds for reversal of bad
grades." 33
28. MURPHY, supra note 2, at 14.
29. See Runyan & Smith, supra note 3, at 322 n. 26 (describing some specific diagnostic tests and
listing sources of further detailed information on testing).
30. Id. Recent diagnostic theory emphasizes that the diagnosis of a learning disability should not rest
on an ability-achievement discrepancy alone. Evaluations must be comprehensive in order to allow diagnos-
ticians to determine whether such a disability is indeed the source of the discrepancy. See KELLER & HALLA-
HAN, supra note 17, at 10. For a detailed discussion of the diagnosis of learning disabilities in adulthood,
with reference to the DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION
(3d ed. 1987) ("DSM-I"), see Michael McCue, Clinical Diagnostic and Functional Assessment of Adults
with Learning Disabilities, in LEARNING DISABILILTIES IN ADULTHOOD: PERSISTING PROBLEMS AND EVOLV-
ING ISSUES, supra note 3, at 55-58.
31. J.K. Torgesen has noted that "school-identified LD children are a group defined by shifting politi-
cal realities, local expediencies, and questionable psychometrics ...." Torgesen, supra note 12, at 6.
J.C. Chalfant has similarly zeroed in on the slippery quality of diagnoses: "The greatest divergence of opin-
ion in the field of learning disabilities relates to diagnosis. There is no consensus regarding the diagnostic
procedures that should be used to specify the nature of a student's problems or the criteria for classifying a
student as learning disabled." Chalfant, Learning Disabilities: Policy Issues and Promising Approaches,
44 AM. PSYCHOL. 392, 393 (1989), quoted in MURPHY, supra note 2, at 137.
32. Arthur Frakt, Schools Wrestle with ADA Standards, NAT'L L.J., August 1, 1994, at A19, A20.
33. Id. at A19.
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To avoid such problems, the California Community College system has de-
veloped detailed uniform criteria for diagnosticians working within its sys-
tem. 34 Many diagnostic problems could be avoided if other large educational
systems would adopt similarly uniform standards. In the meantime, Laura
Rothstein suggests that colleges and standardized testing services require spe-
cific documentation of a learning disability. Such documentation should be not
more than three years old, should be compiled by a professional, and should be
based on specific, identified tests. 35
However they may have acquired the label, many learning disabled people
can generate the same work product as non-learning disabled people by em-
ploying slightly different methods of working. Indeed, while lay people may
think of the learning disabled as people who cannot reach the same goals as
others, a more accurate paradigm would cast the learning disabled as people
who take alternate routes to arrive at the same destinations as non-learning
disabled people.
For example, a bankruptcy judge who describes himself as severely learning
disabled has published insightful, well-respected opinions in highly complex
cases. 36 Among the judge's disabling conditions is dysgraphia, a learning dis-
ability that causes handwriting difficulties. 37 Because this disability affects
only the judge's ability to put his thoughts physically on paper-and not his
ability to generate those thoughts-a simple change in the method of expres-
sion, from pen to voice, has enabled him to all but overcome his disability
with the aid of a dictaphone.
Similarly, a Chief Regional attorney for the Office of Civil Rights of the
Department of Education has been successfully practicing law despite a learn-
ing disability that affects the speed of his reading. 38 Again, an alternate work-
ing style has been responsible for his success. The attorney has found that he is
able to read texts faster when they have been photo-enlarged. In addition, he
admits that he willingly spends extra time in the evenings and on holidays and
weekends in order to stay on top of the reading he must do. 39
34. For a detailed description of this diagnostic system, see Vogel, supra note 2, at 94-97.
35. Rothstein, supra note 19, at 27.
36. See generally Jeffry H. Gallet, The Judge Who Could Not Tell His Right from His Left and Other
Tales of Learning Disabilities, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 739 (1989).
37. Id. at 743.
38. Paul D. Grossman, Chief Regional Attorney, Region IX, U.S. Dept. of Education Office of Civil
Rights, Remarks at the Joint Conference on Disability Issues, St. Louis, Mo. (April 7, 1995). This confer-
ence was sponsored jointly by the American Bar Association, the Association of American Law Schools,
the Law School Admission Council, and the National Conference of Bar Examiners.
39. Id. These work habits also enabled Mr. Grossman, while a law student at the University of Wis-
consin, to be accepted to the law review and to graduate Order of the Coif. While Mr. Grossman did not
January 19971
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In the above cases, neither practitioner's learning disabilities severely af-
fected the analytical process itself. Instead, their disabilities involved the tak-
ing in of information (through reading) and the expressing of information
(through writing). With some creative adaptation, people with these types of
disabilities can work around them by finding alternate means of perceiving
and expressing information.
The situation is more difficult for people whose disabilities affect the actual
reasoning process. Some learning disabilities may affect one's ability to organ-
ize thoughts, to put ideas in sequence, to generalize from one situation to an-
other, to pick out key points, and to monitor one's own understanding of
information. 40 These tasks are particularly important in the context of legal
analysis, as well as in the practice of other professions. 41 Thus, while some
learning disabled people may be suited to almost any field, others have limita-
tions that are more difficult to overcome and should concentrate on their
strengths when deciding upon a profession or a course of study. 42
III. Overview of Legislation and Regulations Governing the
Rights of Learning Disabled Law Students
Both the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 43 and the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 44 govern the rights of learning disabled students in law schools.
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act covers institutions of higher education
receiving federal financial assistance, 45 and thus governs the treatment of
learning disabled students in virtually all law schools. Overlapping protections
have more recently been granted by the ADA, which similarly prohibits disa-
receive any accommodations as a student, he emphasized that reasonable accommodations would have
made law school a much less stressful, and perhaps even more productive, experience. Id.
40. McCue, supra note 30, at 58-61; KELLER & HALLAHAN, supra note 17, at 14.
41. See, e.g., Pandazides v. Virginia Bd. of Educ., 804 F. Supp. 794, 803 (E.D. Va. 1992) (noting that
the ability "to read intelligently, to comprehend written and spoken communication accurately, effectively,
and quickly, and to respond to written and spoken communication professionally, effectively, and quickly"
are "essential functions" of teaching special education in Virginia public schools).
42. Rick Ginsberg et al., Employment Success for Adults with Learning Disabilities, in LEARNING DIS-
ABILITIES IN ADULTHOOD: PERSISTING PROBLEMS AND EVOLVING ISSUES, supra note 3, at 204, 210-211
(identifying "goodness-of-fit" between job requirements and a learning disabled person's strengths and
weaknesses as an important factor in successful employment). See also PAMELA B. ADELMAN & CAROL T.
WREN, LEARNING DISABILITIES, GRADUATE SCHOOL, AND CAREERS: A STUDENT'S PERSPECTIVE 23 (1993)
(advising learning disabled students to consider their own cognitive strengths and weaknesses when begin-
ning a job search).
43. 29 U.S.C. § 794.
44. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-13.
45. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (prohibiting discrimination in "any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance").
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bility-based discrimination in public schools, colleges, and universities, 46 and
which also extends the coverage of the Rehabilitation Act to the private
sector. 47
Both of these statutes prohibit discrimination on the basis of a disability,
including a learning disability. The ADA, for example, states that "no quali-
fied individual with a disability shall, by reason of his disability, be excluded
from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or
activities" 48 of a public entity, including a college or university receiving pub-
lic funds. 49 The Rehabilitation Act contains essentially similar language. 50
Regulations accompanying both statutes specifically list learning disabilities
as covered disabilities. 51
Rather than merely prohibiting disparate treatment of disabled individuals,
the legislation, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, requires
institutions to make "reasonable accommodations" when necessary in order to
allow qualified people with disabilities to participate in and benefit from vari-
ous educational programs. 52 Thus, colleges and universities must take active
steps to insure that learning disabled students are accorded meaningful access
to programs of study. The extent of these required steps has naturally been
hotly contested, and this article will later discuss the parameters of "reasonable
accommodation" in several different law school contexts.
46. Title I1 of the ADA ("Public Services"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12133, covers learning disabled stu-
dents in public schools, colleges, and universities.
47. The Americans with Disabilities Act includes "postgraduate private school[s]" in its definition of
"public accommodations." 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(J). Title III of the ADA (Public Accommodations and
Services Operated by Private Entities), §§ 12181-89, therefore governs the rights of learning disabled stu-
dents in such schools.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
49. The ADA defines "public entity" broadly, to include "any department, agency .... or other instru-
mentality of a State or States or local government." 42 U.S.C. § 12131.
50. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
51. 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j)(2)(i)(B) (1995) (regulation accompanying Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act); 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (1995) (regulation accompanying Title II of the ADA, defining "disability").
52. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301 (1985) (interpreting Section 504, and discussing
Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979)):
[A]n otherwise qualified handicapped individual must be provided with meaningful access to
the benefit that the grantee offers. The benefit itself, of course, cannot be defined in a way that
effectively denies otherwise qualified handicapped individuals the meaningful access to which
they are entitled; to assure meaningful access, reasonable accommodations in the grantee's
program or benefit may have to be made.
See also 34 C.F.R. § 104.12 (pursuant to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, covered entities must make
reasonable accommodations when necessary); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (pursuant to Title 11 of the ADA,
public entities must make "reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures" to accommodate
the disabled when necessary).
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Neither the Rehabilitation Act nor the ADA (nor their accompanying regula-
tions) specifically define the term "learning disability"; however, the Individu-
als with Disabilities Education Act 53 provides the following definition:
a disorder in one or more of the basic psychological processes involved in
understanding or in using language, spoken or written, which may mani-
fest itself in an imperfect ability to listen, think, speak, read, write, spell,
or to do mathematical calculations. The term includes such conditions as
perceptual handicaps, brain injury, minimal brain dysfunction, dyslexia,
and developmental aphasia. The term does not include children who have
learning problems which are primarily the result of visual, hearing, or mo-
tor handicaps, or mental retardation, or emotional disturbance, or of envi-
ronmental, cultural, or economic disadvantage. 14
This definition offers some guidance as to the general legal boundaries of
learning disabilities and should be used to interpret the ADA and Section 504
on this point. 55 This definition is essentially similar to the current clinical defi-
nitions discussed above. 56
Despite the availability of a legal definition of learning disabilities in IDEA,
issues of diagnosis continue to arise in litigation under the Rehabilitation Act
and the ADA, both of which require plaintiffs to prove their disabled status in
order to receive anti-discrimination protections. Some recent opinions reflect a
battle of the experts on the issue of whether the plaintiff indeed has a learning
disability. 57 These opinions indicate that courts are more likely to accept diag-
noses of learning disabilities when they come from acknowledged experts in
the field 58 who have used "widely accepted, well established" tests such as the
Woodcock Reading Mastery Tests and the Woodcock-Johnson Tests of
Achievement to arrive at their conclusions. 19 In addition, as a prerequisite to a
court's finding of a learning disability, the plaintiff's expert evidence should
53. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. This legislation was originally called the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act of 1975. In 1990, when Congress amended the statute, its name was changed to the "Individu-
als with Disabilities Education Act" (IDEA). H.R. 1013, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). Because IDEA does
not cover higher education, this article will not discuss it in detail.
54. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(1).
55. See 34 C.F.R. § 104 (App., Subpart A, 1994) (noting that for purposes of interpreting Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act and its regulations, the Department of Education will interpret the term "specific
learning disability" as that term is used in section 602 of the Education of the Handicapped Act (now IDEA,
20 U.S.C. § 1401)); see also Rothstein, supra note 19, at 30.
56. See supra note 12.
57. See, e.g., Pazer v. New York State Bd. of Law Examiners, 849 F. Supp. 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1994);
Argen v. New York State Bd. of Law Examiners, 860 F. Supp. 84 (W.D.N.Y. 1994).
58. Pazer, 849 F. Supp. at 287.
59. Argen, 860 F. Supp. at 91.
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show a connection between the skill or aptitude measured by a diagnostic test
and the skill or aptitude at issue in the discrimination suit. 60
Further, in addition to being learning disabled, a student must be "qualified"
to pursue a given educational program in order to come under the protection of
Section 504 and the ADA.
One is "qualified" upon meeting "the essential eligibility requirements for
the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities" provided
by the educational institution. 61 This meeting of requirements can occur "with
or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal
of... communication... barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and ser-
vices." 62 Thus, the determination of whether a student or prospective student
is qualified to pursue a given educational program must rest in part on an as-
sessment of reasonable accommodations that the school could theoretically of-
fer the student.
A qualified individual with a disability who has suffered discrimination has
a private cause of action against the offending institution under both Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Titles II and III of the ADA. 63 Such an
60. In Argen, 860 F. Supp. 84, the plaintiff sought accommodations on the Bar exam due to an alleged
learning disability that affected his reading comprehension. One of the plaintiff's experts relied on a diag-
nostic test measuring comprehension of spatial relationships to diagnose the disability. Id. at 89. The court
noted that this test was irrelevant to the issue of whether the plaintiff had a learning disability that affected
his reading. The failure of the plaintiff to show a connection between the test and the diagnosis was a
"critical omission" that rendered him unable to prove disabled status. Id.
Similarly, in Pazer, the court rejected the plaintiff's allegation that he suffered from dysgraphia, a
writing disability, noting that the plaintiff never submitted the results of any figure-drawing tests, which are
the tests best designed to diagnose dysgraphia. 849 F. Supp. at 287.
In Pandazides, 804 F. Supp. at 803, the court also rejected a plaintiff's allegation of a disability, noting
that her relatively high scores on the listening section of a standardized test contradicted her psychiatrist's
diagnosis of an auditory processing disorder. The court further noted that the disabilities claimed by the
plaintiff could not be found in the DSM-3R mental illness directory, implying that only disorders listed in
the directory would be recognized as "learning disabilities" for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act. Id.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2). Regulations issued pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act contain similar lan-
guage: one is qualified with respect to postsecondary educational programs if one "meets the academic and
technical standards requisite to admission or participation in the ... education program or activity."
34 C.F.R. § 104.3.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2).
63. Regarding the private right of action available under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, see 29
U.S.C. § 794a. This section makes available the rights and remedies of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d et seq., which courts have held to imply a private right of action; see Cannon v.
Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (Title VI affords a private right of action); see also Doe v. County of
Milwaukee, 871 F. Supp. 1072, 1075 n.7. (E.D. Wisc. 1995) (explaining the procedural connections be-
tween the Rehabilitation Act and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
Regarding the private right of action under Title II of the ADA (Public Services), see 42 U.S.C.
§ 12133 ("The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in section 794a of Title 29 shall be the remedies,
procedures, and rights this subchapter provides... "); see also 28 C.F.R. § 35.164 (App. A)(1994) ("As
with section 504, there is also a private right of action [under Title 11 of the ADA] for persons with disabili-
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individual may also pursue administrative remedies. 64 Excerpts from the legis-
lative history of Title II of the ADA reveal that the House Committee on Edu-
cation and Labor did not intend to require exhaustion of administrative
remedies as a prerequisite to suits under either Section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act or Title II of the ADA, 6S and a number of courts passing on the issue
have held that such exhaustion is in fact not required. 66
Under these provisions, a growing number of learning disabled plaintiffs
have sought to enforce their rights through litigation in recent years. As a re-
sult, a developing body of case law now exists that addresses a number of
issues affecting learning disabled law school applicants and law students.
IV. The Admission Process and Learning Disabled
Law School Applicants
Application and admission to American law schools involve a number of
fairly complicated steps. Typically, persons seeking admission to law schools
register for and take the Law School Aptitude Test and submit transcripts, per-
sonal essays, and recommendations to an admissions committee. Committee
members then make comparative assessments of the applicants' submissions
and extend offers to those who are deemed most qualified. This process raises
ties, which includes the full panoply of remedies."); County of Milwaukee, 871 F. Supp. at 1075 (explaining
that Title 11 of the ADA, like the Rehabilitation Act, affords a private right of action).
Regarding Title IlI of the ADA, see 28 C.F.R. § 36.501 (the available remedies include a private right
of action).
Title I of the ADA, which concerns employment, contains different enforcement provisions, and is
beyond the scope of this article. See 42 U.S.C. § 12133.
64. Concerning Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, see 29 U.S.C. § 794a, which makes available
the administrative remedies set forth in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
Concerning Title II of the ADA, see 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (making available the remedies specified in the
Rehabilitation Act at 29 U.S.C. § 794a); see also 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.170 et seq. (Subpart F) (describing admin-
istrative remedies under Title II).
Concerning Title III of the ADA, see 42 U.S.C. § 12188 (providing for enforcement by the Attorney
General).
65. "[C]onsistent with section 504 [of the Rehabilitation Act], it is not the Committee's intent that
persons with disabilities need to exhaust Federal administrative remedies before exercising their private
right of action [under Title 1I of the ADA]." Report of the House Committee on Education and Labor, H. R.
Rep. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, 98 (1990), quoted in 28 C.F.R. Appendix to Part 35, Subpart F,
at 463.
66. See, e.g., Greater Los Angeles Council of Deafness, Inc. v. Community Television of Southern
California, 719 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1252, reh'g denied, 468 U.S. 1224 (1984)
(no exhaustion required before bringing action under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act); Adashunas v.
Negley, 626 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1980) (same); Aikins v. St. Helena Hosp., 843 F. Supp. 1329, 1339 (N.D.
Cal. 1994)(same); Doe v. County of Milwaukee, 871 F. Supp. 1072, 1075-76 (E.D. Wisc. 1995)(no exhaus-
tion required before bringing suit under Title 11 of the ADA).
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a number of legal issues under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA with re-
spect to learning disabled applicants.
A. General Considerations in the Admissions Process
Law schools of course cannot discriminate on the basis of disability in any
of their programs or activities, including their admissions processes. 67 Dis-
crimination in this context can consist of treating disabled and nondisabled
applicants differently, placing disabled applicants at a disadvantage. 68 How-
ever, schools may in some instances be required to treat disabled applicants
differently by making necessary modifications to their academic requirements
to insure that such requirements do not have the effect of discriminating
against disabled applicants. 69
These provisions do not prevent schools from rejecting disabled applicants
who are considered to be unqualified to matriculate. Neither the ADA nor the
Rehabilitation Act require schools to lower their admission standards to ac-
commodate the disabled. 70 When a disabled applicant is unqualified for ma-
triculation, neither the ADA nor the Rehabilitation Act grants the applicant a
right to admission. Both statutes protect only qualified individuals with
disabilities. 7t
Determining whether a learning disabled applicant is qualified to matricu-
late at a given law school is by no means a simple process. With respect to
postsecondary education, an individual is "qualified" for consideration in the
admission process if he or she "meets the academic and technical standards
requisite to admission." 72 Schools have discretion to set their own academic
67. 29 U.S.C. § 794; 42 U.S.C. §§ 12132 and 12182 (generally prohibiting disability-based discrimina-
tion in all programs and activities); see also 34 C.F.R. § 104.42(a) (prohibiting discrimination in the specific
context of admissions).
68. 34 C.F.R. § 104.4 (prohibiting the provision of services to the disabled that are "not equal" to or
"different" from the services provided to nondisabled people).
69. 34 C.F.R. § 104.44(a) (requiring a public school to make "such modifications to its academic
requirements as are necessary to ensure that such requirements do not discriminate," but noting that require-
ments that are "essential to the program of instruction" will never be found to be discriminatory); see also
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (ADA, Title Ill) (requiring private schools to make "reasonable modifica-
tions in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary" to afford services to the
disabled unless the such modifications would "fundamentally alter the nature" of the services).
70. Halasz v. University of New England, 816 F. Supp. 37, 43 (D. Me. 1993) ("Section 504 clearly
does not require that an educational institution lower its admissions standards to accommodate the handi-
capped.") (citing Wynne v. Tufts University School of Medicine, 976 F.2d 791, 793 (1st Cir. 1991)).
71. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Rehabilitation Act); 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (ADA, Title II); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 12182(b)(2)(A) (i) (ADA, Title IIl) (permitting private schools to use eligibility criteria that tend to screen
out individuals with disabilities when such criteria are "necessary for the provision of... services ... being
offered").
72. 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(k)(3). There has been some disagreement among various OCR offices and vari-
ous courts as to what is meant by "academic and technical standards." A Letter of Finding from OCR
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and technical standards for admission, but they must apply these standards in a
non-discriminatory manner. Therefore, in deciding whether a school has dis-
criminated against a learning disabled applicant in its admission process, the
Office of Civil Rights will attempt to determine whether the standards and
procedures applied to the applicant were the same as those applied to nondis-
abled applicants. Schools may subject known disabled applicants to different
admissions procedures only when the schools are making reasonable modifica-
tions to such procedures in order to avoid a discriminatory effect. 73
Law schools will violate neither the ADA nor the Rehabilitation Act by re-
jecting learning disabled applicants whose LSAT scores and grades are sub-
stantially below those of the average accepted applicant, at least when the
applicants' files reveal no particular additional reasons for admission. In a re-
cent letter of finding, for example, the OCR found that Duke Law School had
not violated the law by rejecting an applicant, known to be disabled, who pre-
sented a 2nd percentile LSAT score, based on an accommodated administra-
tion of the test, and a 2.85 undergraduate GPA. The OCR noted that the
average LSAT score for admitted students fell between the 97th and 98th per-
centile and that the average GPA was 3.71. 74 Washington and Lee was simi-
larly within its rights in rejecting an identified disabled applicant presenting
Region V indicates that these standards refer only to prerequisites for consideration for admission, such as
graduation from an accredited college or university and submission of a completed application form. Thus,
an applicant was considered to have met the requirements of § 104.3(k)(3), despite having a very low LSAT
scores and a low GPA. See University of Minnesota, 6 NDLR 295 (1995). The OCR thus found that the
applicant was a "qualified" individual with a disability under § 104.3(k)(3) and moved to the issue of
whether the applicant, who had been rejected, had received discriminatory treatment during the admissions
process. Id. See also University of Massachusetts Medical Center, 4 NDLR 314 (1993) (Letter of Finding
from OCR Region I, similarly interpreting the "academic and technical standards" of § 104.3(k)(3)).
Another OCR office and at least one court interpret the "academic and technical standards" cited in
§ 104.3(k)(3) more broadly to cover all of a school's requirements for actual admission. Thus, the Region
IV OCR office determined that a low LSAT score and a low GPA rendered an applicant to Duke Law
School unable to meet the school's "academic and technical standards" for admission, and, thus, not a
"qualified" individual with a disability. See Duke University, 4 NDLR 448 (1993); see also Halasz, 816 F.
Supp. at 43 (finding that an applicant to undergraduate school with low test scores and poor grades was not
"qualified" for admission under Section 504). See also Emory University, 5 NDLR 79 (1993) (Region IV
Letter of Finding, interpreting "academic and technical standards" with similar breadth).
This broader interpretation accords best with the overall language of the regulation, which speaks of
"academic and technical standards for admission," and not standards for consideration for admission. It
appears that "technical" standards may refer to standard prerequisites to consideration, such as submission
of a completed application form. "Academic standards for admission," therefore, must refer to the overall
quality of an applicant that is assessed throughout the remainder of the admission process. Thus, if a school
has drawn a line between applicants admitted and applicants rejected in a given year based on various
criteria, a failure to meet such criteria will prevent an applicant from being a "qualified" individual with a
disability, provided that the school assessed the applicant in a nondiscriminatory manner.
73. 34 C.F.R. § 104.44(a).
74. Duke University, 4 NDLR 448 (1993).
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identical statistics, when the average accepted applicant had a 3.47 GPA and
an LSAT score between the 91st and 92nd percentiles. 75 In both of these
cases, the OCR noted that the application files contained no evidence indicat-
ing that the applicant had potential for success despite the low indicators. 76
Evidence of earlier or contemporaneous acceptance of qualified learning
disabled applicants will bolster a school's argument that it did not discriminate
in rejecting a given disabled applicant. In the Washington and Lee case the
OCR was swayed by the fact that the school had accepted four applicants (in
the same year it considered the complainant) who had disclosed their learning
disabilities in the application process. 77 Similarly, in a letter of finding regard-
ing Emory's admission process (triggered by the rejection of an applicant suf-
fering from dyslexia and attention deficit disorder) the OCR noted with
approval that some currently enrolled Emory law students had the same disor-
ders. 78 The OCR found that Emory had not violated the Rehabilitation Act in
rejecting the complainant, who presented comparatively low grades and test
scores. 79
In general, schools may hold disabled and non-disabled applicants to the
same standards. As long as the admission process accords both groups an
equal opportunity to show that they have met a school's standards, the schools
should not run afoul of the law in making admissions decisions. In some cases,
it may become necessary for a school to modify its admission procedure to
insure that all students have this equal opportunity. In such cases, a school
must make whatever reasonable modifications are necessary to guard against
discrimination. 80 While the OCR has never found a violation on numbers
alone, a 100 percent rejection rate with respect to learning disabled applicants
may indicate that a school has failed to afford applicants an equal opportunity
to demonstrate qualifications. Such a school would have to make reasonable
procedural modifications to insure equal opportunity. The issues of whether
and how a school must modify admissions procedures arises most commonly
in the context of the assessment of standardized test scores.
B. Learning Disabled Applicants and the LSAT
Because learning disabilities often interfere with performance on standard-
ized tests, the LSAT stands as a particularly high hurdle for many learning
75. Washington and Lee University, 5 NDLR 78 (1993).
76. 4 NDLR 448; 5 NDLR 78.
77. Id.
78. Emory University, 5 NDLR 79 (1993).
79. Id.
80. 34 C.F.R. § 104.44(a).
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disabled law school applicants. In recent years, Law Services, the agency that
administers the LSAT, has granted accommodations to learning disabled
LSAT-takers, usually in the form of extra time to take the test. 81 Law Services
does not receive federal funds and is therefore not directly required by the
Rehabilitation Act to make such accommodations. However, the Act's regula-
tions prohibit law schools from basing decisions upon standardized admission
tests like the LSAT unless disabled applicants have an opportunity to take such
tests with reasonable accommodations. 82 For this reason, Law Services began
to offer accommodations even before the passage of the ADA, which now spe-
cifically requires private testing organizations to offer testing accommodations
to disabled persons. 83
1. Flagging of Accommodated Test Scores by Private Testing
Organizations
While Law Services has conducted numerous studies of the accuracy of the
LSAT as a measure of law school performance, it has not as yet confirmed that
an accommodated test is as accurate a measure of performance as a test taken
under normal testing conditions. 84 For this reason, Law Services has devel-
oped a practice of including in its report of test results a notation indicating
whether a given test was taken with accommodations. This practice of noting
accommodated tests is commonly known as "flagging." 85
Flagging has come under fire in recent years. Opponents of the practice ar-
gue that by specially noting accommodated test results, testing organizations
allow schools to identify disabled applicants during the admission process. Re-
81. Wrightman, supra note 1, at 1.
82. 34 C.F.R. § 104.42(b). Law schools must assure themselves that "admissions tests are selected and
administered so as to best ensure that, when a test is administered to an applicant who has a handicap that
impairs sensory, manual, or speaking skills, the test results accurately reflect the applicant's aptitude or
achievement level ... rather than reflecting the applicant's impaired sensory, manual, or speaking
skills... " Id. at § 104.42 (b)(3). Learning disabled students could certainly be said to have impaired "sen-
sory" skills, and the Office of Civil Rights has applied this regulation to cases involving learning disabled
test takers. See SUNY Health Sciences Center at Brooklyn, 5 NDLR 77 (1993) (finding violations with
respect to medical school's treatment of learning disabled applicant's MCAT score).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 12189; 28 C.F.R. § 36.309. The regulations implementing this section of the ADA
specifically mention extra time as an accommodation that may be required in some cases. 28 C.F.R.
§ 36.309(b)(2).
Another reason that testing services, including Law Services, began to study and provide accommoda-
tions before the passage of the ADA was a widely discussed 1982 article that called into question the prac-
tice of using standardized testing methods to measure the aptitudes of disabled people. See ABILITY TESTING
OF HANDICAPPED PEOPLE: DILEMMA FOR GOVERNMENT, SCIENCE AND THE PUBLIC (S. Sherman & H.
Robinson eds. 1982), cited in Laura F. Rothstein, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act: Emerging Issues for
Colleges and Universities, 13 J. OF COLL. & UNIV. L. 229, 245 (1986).
84. See Wrightman, supra note 1, at 51-52.
85. Id.
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habilitation Act regulations prohibit schools from directly asking applicants
whether they are disabled. 86 Thus, one could argue that flagging allows
schools to discover indirectly what they are prevented from discovering
directly. 87
In response to the above criticism, Law Services contends that it must con-
tinue the practice of flagging accommodated LSAT scores for several reasons.
First, no evidence presently exists that allows Law Services to claim that ac-
commodated LSAT scores measure an applicant's potential for success in law
school as well as unaccommodated scores. In fact, a 1993 study showed a
tendency toward overprediction of law school success for learning disabled
LSAT takers who had received testing accommodations. 88 The validity of this
study has been called into question because the study failed to track whether
the test takers later received accommodations in law school. Nevertheless, the
fact remains that it has yet to be demonstrated whether accommodated LSAT's
are reliable predictors of law school performance. There thus remains a need
for Law Services to flag accommodated scores to notify law schools that such
scores may not be as valid as unaccommodated scores.
In addition, Law Services contends that even if schools are allowed indi-
rectly to identify disabled students through flagged test scores, this identifica-
tion does not result in biased treatment of disabled applicants. The 1993 Law
Services study found that accommodated and unaccommodated test takers
with similar test results and undergraduate grades were admitted to law
schools at the same rate and that therefore the flagging of accommodated tests,
in and of itself, made no difference in the admission process. 89
The Law Services policy thus seems to be a logical course to follow until
data are available to show that accommodated scores are as valid as other
scores in predicting academic success. Such a showing may be impossible,
however, because it would require an assessment of accurate data regarding
the correlation of accommodated LSAT performance and accommodated law
school performance. Accommodations accorded in law school are made on a
highly individualized basis, and it is therefore difficult to control comparisons
of LSAT and academic performance across large groups of disabled students
who have received accommodations in both contexts. If reliable studies ever
show that accommodated scores are less predictive of law school success, then
testing organizations, rather than continuing the flagging process, should con-
86. See 34 C.F.R. § 104.42(b)(4) (with narrow exceptions, schools may not make pre-admission in-
quiries as to whether an applicant is disabled).
87. See Rothstein, supra note 83, at 53.
88. See Wrightman, supra note 1, at 48-49.
89. Wrightman, supra note 1, at 24-32, 51.
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sider altering their accommodations in order to bring the predictive value of
accommodated and unaccommodated scores more closely in line.
Against this backdrop of uncertainty, Law Services and other testing organi-
zations are presently allowed to continue the practice of flagging under an in-
terim policy of the Department of Education. 90 The OCR's present policy
allows schools to consider flagged scores in the admission process so long as
schools do not use scores as the sole criterion for admission and do not deny
applicants admission simply because they took a test with accommodations. 91
However, the OCR has taken the position that flagging may violate the rights
of disabled test takers under the Rehabilitation Act by allowing schools to dis-
cover an applicant's disabled status. 92 For the present, however, no signs indi-
cate that the interim policy of the Department of Education that permits
flagging per se will undergo immediate change. 93
2. Schools' Treatment of Flagged Test Scores
Law school admissions committees are presently trapped in a double bind
with respect to their treatment of flagged test scores during the admission pro-
cess. On the one hand, Law Services has yet to establish that accommodated
(and therefore flagged) test results are as predictive of academic success as are
unaccommodated test results. On the other hand, the Rehabilitation Act and
the ADA arguably require admissions committees to give equal weight to both
kinds of test results during the admission process. 94
An OCR ruling against the College of Medicine at the SUNY Health Sci-
ence Center at Brooklyn demonstrates the risk that schools face. The OCR
held that the school had violated Rehabilitation Act regulations in its admis-
sion process by assigning lower weight to MCAT scores taken under nonstan-
90. See RECRUITMENT, ADMISSIONS, AND STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES: A GUIDE FOR COMPLIANCE
WITH SECTION 504 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973 AND AMENDMENTS 1992 AND THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990 10 (Heath Resources Center, ed., 3d ed. 1994).
91. See SUNY Health Sciences Center at Brooklyn, 5 NDLR 77 (1993).
92. Id.
93. Telephone interview with Joan Van Tol, Corporate Counsel, Law Services, Newtown, Penn-
sylvania (September 13, 1995).
94. Disparate treatment of accommodated and unaccommodated test results is arguably a type of "dis-
crimination" on the basis of disability prohibited by the anti-discrimination provisions of the ADA, 42
U.S.C. § 12132 (Title Il) and 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (Title III), and of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794.
More specifically, regulations promulgated pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act clarify that illegal discrimina-
tion may consist of providing services that are "not equal" to disabled and non-disabled people, 34 C.F.R.
§ 104.4(b)(1)(ii), or of providing "different" services to disabled and non-disabled people, 34 C.F.R.
§ 104.4(b)(l)(iv). The OCR has held that a medical school violated these regulations by devaluing accom-
modated MCAT scores in its admission process. See SUNY Health Science Center at Brooklyn, 5 NDLR
77 (1993).
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dard conditions. 95 Because the school did not have a specific policy regarding
the interpretation of flagged MCAT scores, the OCR interviewed admissions
committee members to determine how the committee was in fact treating such
scores. Particularly troubling to the OCR were comments by one admissions
committee member, who noted that he was "wary" about high scores with
flags and that he would be likely to examine an applicant "more carefully" if
the applicant presented such a score along with weak undergraduate grades. 96
The committee member also noted that if he were presented with two equally
low MCAT scores-one taken with accommodations and the other without
-he would assume that the unaccommodated test taker did not perform well
on standardized tests, but would not necessarily make the same beneficial as-
sumption about the accommodated test taker. 97
Based on these statements, the OCR concluded that SUNY was "devaluing"
accommodated MCAT scores and was weighing applications presenting such
scores "in a different and lesser manner than other applications." 98 These acts
constituted "differential treatment on the basis of disability" according to the
OCR, and this differential treatment violated Rehabilitation Act regulations re-
quiring equal provision of services to disabled and nondisabled people. 99
SUNY's treatment of the flagged scores was understandable, at least to a
point, given that experts have recommended that admissions personnel treat
accommodated scores "cautiously." 100 In the law school context, Law Ser-
vices has specifically noted that accommodated LSAT scores "cannot be relied
upon to provide indications of first-year performance in law school to the
same extent that scores earned by students at regular LSAT administrations
can be." 101 If the testing service tells admissions personnel that accommodated
scores are less reliable than other scores, the natural response is for admissions
personnel to devalue these scores in the admission process. However, auto-
matic devaluation is fraught with danger.
Law schools can take certain steps to avoid being caught in this double
bind. First, to the extent a student discloses a disability in the admission pro-
cess, admissions committee members should give a high LSAT with a flag as
much weight as any other equally high LSAT score. Devaluing a high stan-
dardized test score simply because it is flagged will be held to be discrimina-
tory. Conversely, if an application contains a low LSAT score with a flag, a





100. Vogel, supra note 2, at 9.
101. Wrightman, supra note 1, at 52.
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school should consider making reasonable modifications to its admissions pro-
cedures 102 to ensure that the committee will have a full opportunity to ascer-
tain the overall quality of the application. This modification might consist of
having committee members review the file specifically to determine whether
other factors in the application might merit a positive admissions decision. 103
Further, if an application contains earlier unflagged scores, admissions com-
mittee members should determine whether grades and LSAT scores improved
after the applicant was diagnosed and received accommodations. This infor-
mation can indicate whether the applicant has potential for success if he or she
receives accommodations in law school, and can again be used to help the
committee interpret the raw LSAT scores.
In addition, law schools can ask all applicants to provide substantial infor-
mation in addition to test scores, which will allow admissions committees to
develop a fuller and more accurate picture of every applicant's true potential
for success in law school. 104 Letters of recommendation from people who
have first-hand information about an applicant's work habits and work product
can often say more about a specific applicant's potential than can any stan-
dardized test. Writing samples can allow a disabled applicant to demonstrate
analytical ability, even if the applicant's disability leads to problems on stan-
dardized multiple choice tests. Although considerations of efficiency may
counsel otherwise, if an admissions committee bases its decisions on a broad
range of criteria when evaluating both disabled and nondisabled applicants, it
is less likely to run afoul of the law governing treatment of standardized test
results. Further, by relying on a range of sources, a committee is less likely to
be misled by accommodated test scores, insofar as such scores may not always
be reliable predictors of potential success.
Law schools should also give disabled students an opportunity to explain
why they believe themselves to be capable of achieving success in law school.
While pre-admission inquiries about disabilities are prohibited, 105 law schools
102. Such reasonable modifications are required by regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act,
34 C.F.R. § 104.44(a), and the ADA, 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7).
103. Noting that the University of Minnesota had made such a modification to its admissions proce-
dures in a particular case, the OCR determined that the school had not run afoul of the Rehabilitation Act or
the ADA. University of Minnesota, 6 NDLR 295 (1995).
104. Rothstein, supra note 19, at 32 (advising schools to take factors other than test results into ac-
count, even when test results have been shown to be valid). Additional information may be crucial in the
evaluation of certain applicants, given a recent OCR Letter of Finding indicating that "under Section 504
and the ADA, applicants may seek adjustments to admissions criteria due to a disability, including release
from requirements to take standardized tests." University of Massachusetts Medical Center, 4 NDLR 314
(1993). No language in the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA, or their accompanying regulations directly sup-
ports this right to release, however.
105. See Rothstein, supra note 19, at 32.
[Vol. 26, No. I
Reasonable Accommodations and Awkward Compromises 51
remain free to invite students to comment generally upon their abilities, and
applicants are free to disclose their disabilities voluntarily in the application
process if they choose to do so. Indeed, more and more learning disabled stu-
dents are choosing to disclose their disabilities in personal essays, which give
them a chance to explain why standardized multiple choice tests, even when
taken under accommodated conditions, may not be accurate predictors of their
potential for success. 106 Such personal statements not only allow admissions
committees to judge an applicant's writing skills, but also provide assistance
in the interpretation of a flagged LSAT score.
V. Reasonable Accommodation of Learning Disabled Students
in Law School
Law schools have a duty not to discriminate on the basis of learning disabil-
ities, and this duty applies not only to the admissions process, but also to the
administration of all "programs and activities," including courses, examina-
tions, and extracurricular activities. 107 With respect to such programs and ac-
tivities, school administrators have a duty to provide reasonable
accommodations to allow learning disabled students to participate fully. 108
According to one regional OCR office, schools must provide accommodations
even during the interim period when students are being tested to determine
their eligibility as "disabled individuals" under the Rehabilitation Act and the
ADA. 109 In addition, in every case, schools must provide accommodations
106. See Rothstein, supra note 19, at 31 (advising disclosure when the disability has been responsible
for poor past performance, especially in cases in which the school has a good reputation for providing
disability services).
Students seeking to have schools excuse poor grades or test scores should provide some evidence of
potential for success. In Halasz v. University of New England, 816 F. Supp. 37 (D. Me. 1993), a learning
disabled applicant asked the University of New England to ignore his past poor school performance and his
low SAT score, but offered no positive evidence of his qualifications. The court noted that the student was in
effect seeking to have the school "abandon all criteria for admissions" and held that the Rehabilitation Act
did not require such an abandonment. Id. at 43.
107. 29 U.S.C. § 704; 34 C.F.R. § 104.4.
108. 34 C.F.R. § 104.12 (regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act); 42 U.S.C. § 12189 (ADA
Title Ill). While Title III generally applies only to private professional schools, this particular section of
Title III requires "any person" administering courses or exams to do so in a nondiscriminatory fashion.
Presumably, the definition of "person" here is the same as the definition of "person" that appears in Title I
of the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(7) (adopting the definition of "person" found in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e,
which includes governments and governmental agencies). Thus, it appears that, as governmental agencies,
state schools are covered by this section of Title III and by its implementing regulation. See Pazer v.
New York State Bd. of Law Examiners, 849 F. Supp. 284, 286-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding that § 12189 of
ADA Title 111 covers not only private entities, but also public entities such as a state board of bar
examiners).
109. San Jose State Univ., 4 NDLR 358 (1993).
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within a reasonable time after they are requested. 110 However, accommoda-
tions that substantially alter a program or lower academic standards are never
required. "I
Schools have a duty to explore the availability of reasonable accommoda-
tions for disabled students, and in so doing they must consider alternatives to
the status quo that will allow disabled students to participate in school activi-
ties. 112 In reviewing schools' accommodation decisions, the circuit courts
have accorded a certain degree of deference to school officials. 113 For exam-
ple, in assessing Tufts University School of Medicine's decision to require a
student to take an exam in writing rather than in a requested oral format, the
First Circuit noted that
the point is not whether a medical school is "right" or "wrong" in making
program-related decisions .... The point is that Tufts, after undertaking a
diligent assessment of the available options, felt itself obliged to make "a
professional, academic judgment that [a] reasonable accommodation [was]
simply not available.". .. Phrased another way, Tufts decided, rationally
if not inevitably, that no further accommodation could be made without
imposing an undue (and injurious) hardship on the academic program. 114
Now-Justice Breyer, in dissenting from the First Circuit's earlier reversal of
a summary judgment in Tufts' favor, spoke of according an even higher de-
gree of deference to the university. Breyer would have affirmed the summary
110. See, e.g., Oregon State Univ. 5 NDLR 19 (1993) (finding that a school's failure to address
delays in its provision of taped texts could constitute a violation of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act).
111. 34 C.F.R. § 104.44(a) (regulation implementing Rehabilitation Act); Wynne v. Tufts Univ.
School of Medicine, 932 F.2d 19, 24, 26 (1st Cir. 1991). See also 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(ii) (Title III of
the ADA) (requiring reasonable accommodations unless they would "fundamentally alter" a given
program).
112. Wynne, 932 F.2d at 26.
113. See, e.g., id. at 25 ("When judges are asked to review the substance of a genuinely academic
decision.... they should show great respect for the faculty's professional judgment.") (quoting Regents of
Univ. of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985)). See also Doherty v. Southern College of Optome-
try, 862 F.2d 570, 574 (6th Cir. 1988) cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810 (1989) (school proved that accommodation
was not required by showing that clinical component was "necessary part of curriculum"). In Doherty, an
optometry student was unable to work with certain instruments due to a physical disability. Although the
plaintiff argued that not all optometrists use such instruments, the Sixth Circuit noted that the "school may
set standards for its program that insure a particular level of competence in particular areas." Id. The Fifth
Circuit has shown even greater deference to schools' decisions. In McGregor v. Louisiana State Univ., 3
F.2d 850, 859 (1993), it held that once a school demonstrated that its requirements were reasonable, the
burden fell on the student-plaintiff to demonstrate that a requested modification would not compromise
academic standards.
114. Wynne v. Tufts Univ. School of Medicine, 976 F.2d 791, 795 (lst Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S.Ct. 1845 (1993).
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judgment as long as Tufts had submitted evidence that those who set the
school's academic standards believed that certain skills were "best tested" by a
written multiple choice exam. 115 He based this more deferential standard in
part on the fact that the plaintiff's alleged learning disability was "closely re-
lated to... an inability to learn to become a good doctor, to which Tufts rea-
sonably, and lawfully, need not 'accommodate."' 116 Further, Breyer noted that
"the designing of tests aimed at screening out those who will not become good
doctors is a quintessentially academic task, close to the heart of a professional
school's basic mission." 117
While some level of deference to schools in this area is certainly required,
Breyer's standard may go too far. It would be a better balance of the student's
and the school's rights to require a school to explain why the student's pro-
posed accommodation is unworkable, rather than just accepting the school's
word that the status quo is best. Under Breyer's system, schools would have
no reason to explore options with any degree of seriousness. How can a school
know which teaching and testing methods are best if it has not seriously con-
sidered all of the alternatives? Once a school has made such a consideration,
the courts should defer to a school's articulated reasons for denying a re-
quested accommodation. Further, even if a school determines that a given ac-
commodation will not fundamentally change its program or lower its
standards, the school is still allowed to require documentation of the need for a
particular accommodation before granting it. 118
A. Course accommodations
Regulations pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act require public postsecondary
schools to make "modifications" to academic requirements in order to prevent
disability discrimination. 119 The regulations specifically list "changes in the
length of time permitted for the completion of degree requirements, substitu-
115. Wynne, 932 F.2d at 27, 30.
116. Id. at 30-31.
117. Id. at 31.
118. See Northwestern College (OH), 6 NDLR 261 (1995) (no violation when school did not allow
student to take test in requested oral format and when student's psychological evaluation did not indicate
that oral testing was necessary to allow the student to succeed in the course); see also State Univ. of
New York, 4 NDLR 432 (1993) (no violation in giving multiple choice rather than essay test when evalu-
ators did not find need for essay format). Laura Rothstein of the University of Houston has emphasized that
schools should strive to accommodate students only when necessary, in an appropriate, tailored fashion.
Cookbook accommodations serve neither schools nor students. Remarks at the Joint Conference on Disabil-
ity Issues, St. Louis, MO (April 7, 1995) (This conference was sponsored jointly by the American Bar
Association, the Association of American Law Schools, the Law School Admission Council, and the Na-
tional Conference of Bar Examiners).
119. 6534 C.F.R. § 104.44.
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tion of specific courses .... and adaptation of the manner in which specific
courses are conducted" as possible modifications. 120 Regulations implement-
ing Title III of the ADA require similarly described modifications to be made
by private schools, 121 and the regulations list videotapes, cassettes, and pre-
pared notes as aids that may be required in some cases to make courses acces-
sible to disabled people. 122 Specialized tutoring has been classified as a
personal service rather than an aid to accessibility, and schools therefore have
not generally been required to provide such tutoring to any disabled
student. 123
Many undergraduate institutions have provided a wide variety of course ac-
commodations to students, and law schools in recent years have begun to fol-
low this pattern. At the far end of the spectrum, the Hastings College of Law at
the University of California can provide, among other accommodations, note-
takers, typists, transcribers, tape recordings of books, readers, library assist-
ants, special research training, extensions of deadlines for written assignments,
and proofreaders for written assignments. 124 Of course, a school has a legal
obligation to provide such accommodations only if they neither fundamentally
alter the law school's educational program nor lower academic standards.
When a student challenges a school's decision to deny a particular accommo-
dation, the student must show that the requested accommodation was neces-
sary and not simply helpful. Such a showing may be difficult to make in a case
in which the school has already granted the student many other accommoda-
tions. In a recent OCR matter, an engineering student filed an administrative
complaint against the University of Southwestern Louisiana, alleging failure to
accommodate despite the fact that the student had been afforded note-takers,
taped lectures, tutors, and extended time on exams. 125 The regional OCR of-
fice found that the student's academic failure could not be traced to the Uni-
versity's actions or omissions and, thus, found no violation of the
Rehabilitation Act or the ADA. 126
Similarly, the medical student in the Tufts University case had received
tutoring, counseling, note-taking services, taped lectures, untimed exams, and
120. Id. at § 104.44 (a).
121. 28 C.F.R. § 36.309(c)(l)-(2).
122. Id. at § 36.309(c)(5).
123. See 34 C.F.R. § 104.44(d)(2) ("Recipients need not provide attendants, individually prescribed
devices, readers for personal use or study, or other devices or services of a personal nature."); Oregon State
Univ., 5 NDLR 19 (1993) (holding that tutoring is not an "auxiliary aid" but instead a personal service).
124. "Addressing the Needs of Students with Disabilities," material submitted by Patsy Wegner Op-
penheim, Hastings College of Law, for Joint Conference on Disability Issues, St. Louis, MO (April 1995).
125. Univ. of Southwestern Louisiana, 4 NDLR 357 (1993).
126. Id.
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a waiver of the school's policy that would normally have prevented him from
repeating the first-year medical curriculum. 127 Nevertheless, he sued, alleging
that the school's denial of his request for an oral exam constituted discrimina-
tion through failure to provide reasonable accommodations. In this case, the
student did make a prima facie showing that the written multiple choice format
put him at a disadvantage due to his specific disability. 128 The First Circuit
then placed a burden on the school to demonstrate that requiring the adminis-
tration of its exam in (accommodated) written format was nevertheless appro-
priate, because administering the exam in oral format would either have
fundamentally altered its program or lowered academic standards. 129 The First
Circuit's opinion, however, noted that this burden would be easier to carry in a
case in which the school had already provided numerous other accommoda-
tions and in which the plaintiff had never expressly requested the specific ac-
commodation at issue. 130
At least one court has held that while a student may have a right to accom-
modations in a course, he does not have a special right to pass the course and
remain a student in good standing. In McGregor v. Louisiana State University,
the Fifth Circuit drew a distinction between individuals qualified for admis-
sion to a law school and individuals qualified to progress. 131 The plaintiff had
failed to earn the minimum GPA required for advancement into his second
year of law school after having received various accommodations during his
first year. 132 The student requested a waiver of the minimum GPA require-
ment, asking the school to accommodate his disability by advancing him auto-
matically to the next year. The Fifth Circuit held that the school was permitted
to deny this request because the student, based on his GPA, was not qualified
to remain in school. 133 The distinction between qualification for advancement
and qualification for admission was easy to draw because LSU used a Darwin-
ian system under which it accepted almost all applicants, but culled the class
before graduation by failing many students in the first and second year. 134
127. Wynne, 976 F.2d at 792, 795.
128. Wynne, 932 F.2d at 21.
129. Wynne, 976 F.2d at 795.
130. Id. at 795-96.
131. 3 F.2d 850, 854 (1993).
132. Id. at 856.
133. Id. at 860.
134. The attrition rate in the 1980s ranged from 14.3% to 35%. Id. at 854. Since the upper reaches of
this range is abnormally high, one might be tempted to argue that LSU's admissions process is really two
years long-from application until advancement into the third year. From such a perspective, the disabled
student's request for accommodation would appear more reasonable, as a request for accommodated admis-
sions consideration rather than as a demand to advance from one year to the next.
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The OCR was presented with a similar case recently. The student had failed
to meet minimum requirements in a practice teaching course and was told that
she would receive no credit. She demanded a grade of "conditional pass" as an
accommodation, although such a grade did not exist in the school's grading
system and was inconsistent with that system. In its Letter of Finding, the
OCR noted that the law does not require a university to "create a new grade
classification as an academic adjustment." 135 This holding parallels the Fifth
Circuit's holding that a school need not pass a student through its program if
the student fails to meet minimum requirements.
B. Exam accommodations
Because grades on the sole end-of-semester exam are the hard currency of
success in the highly competitive law school experience, many disputes be-
tween law schools and students focus upon the appropriateness of accommo-
dations related to testing and exams. 136 Title III of the ADA devotes specific
attention to testing, noting that test administrators must offer exams in "a place
and manner accessible to persons with disabilities." 137 This requirement will
probably be interpreted to apply to public as well as private schools. 138 The
regulation implementing this section of the ADA specifically directs schools
to insure that the results of their testing methods accurately reflect the stu-
dent's "aptitude or achievement level or whatever other factor the examination
purports to measure" rather than the student's disability. 139 Regulations imple-
menting the Rehabilitation Act contain a similar general charge. 140
Testing modifications may include an oral rather than a written format; a
reader or an audiotaped version of written test instructions; a private examina-
tion room; the use of a typewriter or computer; and an exam schedule that
allows for adequate time between tests. 141 Like the course modifications dis-
cussed above, these measures will be required only if the student can docu-
ment a need for them 142 and only if they neither substantially alter the
curricular program nor compromise academic standards. 43
135. Cal. State Univ., Sacramento, 4 NDLR 359 (1993).
136. See, e.g., Wynne, 932 F.2d 19.
137. 42 U.S.C. § 12189.
138. See Pazer, 849 F. Supp. at 286-87.
139. 28 C.F.R. § 36.309.(b)(1)(i).
140. 34 C.F.R. § 104.44(c).
141. Runyan & Smith, supra note 3, at 329-330.
142. See generally SUNY, 4 NDLR 432 (1993); Northwestern College (OH), 6 NDLR 261
(1995).
143. In Wynne, 976 F.2d 791, for example, Tufts was not obligated to change its testing format when
it had considered the requested alternative and determined that it would compromise the school's standards.
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The most common exam accommodation accorded to students at the post-
secondary level is an allowance of extra time. t44 Traditionally, and especially
in the first year, a law student's grade depends almost entirely on one exami-
nation in which she must demonstrate (in a non-directed essay) her relative
facility in applying the subject matter of the course (knowledge gained) to a
complex factual scenario riddled with invitations for wrong turns. Such exami-
nations are supposed to allow students to exhibit qualities thought to be impor-
tant to success in the profession. Thus, the exam is not just a test of how much
law has been learned, but how well a student can read closely, identify genuine
issues, develop a step-by-step logical argument, recognize and dispose of
counter-arguments, resolve ambiguities lurking in the interstices of the cases
and statutes studied, and convey points fluently and persuasively. The fixed
time period in which a student must normally accomplish these tasks simply
exacerbates the stress of the entire experience.
Predictably, allowing extra time to learning disabled students while continu-
ing to limit the time given to non-learning disabled students to complete ex-
ams has raised concerns regarding fairness to the latter. 145 Recent research,
however, indicates that non-learning disabled students do not generally benefit
from extra time, at least not to the dramatic extent that learning disabled stu-
dents do. 146 Judging how much extra time to allow a given student, however,
is probably more an art than a science. 147 Because each learning disabled stu-
dent is different, it is almost impossible to measure how much extra time will
level the playing field in a given case and how much time will cause the field
to tilt to the advantage of the learning disabled student. Nevertheless, those
who evaluate learning disabilities tend to include specific recommendations
regarding extra exam time in their evaluations, and the courts, for lack of any
other guideline, appear to be obligating schools to follow such
recommendations.
144. Vogel, supra note 2, at 13. This accommodation is specifically contemplated in the ADA regula-
tions. 28 C.F.R. § 36.309(b)(2) ("Required modifications to an examination may include changes in the
length of time permitted for completion of the examination and adaptation of the manner in which the
examination is given.").
145. Runyan & Smith, supra note 3, at 328.
146. Mary Kay Runyan, The Effect of Extra Time on Reading Comprehension Scores for University
Students with and Without Learning Disabilities, 24 J. LEARNING DISABILMES 104 (Feb. 1991); George
Almon Hill, Learning Disabled College Students: The Assessment of Academic Aptitude (1984) (unpub-
lished doctoral dissertation, Texas Technical Univ., Lubbock), cited in Runyan & Smith, supra note 3, at
328; see also M. Kay Runyan, Learning Disabilities Defined (1995) (materials submitted to Joint Confer-
ence on Disability issues, St. Louis, MO, April 1995). All of these studies note that there is a point of
diminishing returns even for learning disabled students. The benefit received from some extra time is not
much greater than that received from an allowance of unlimited time.
147. See Runyan & Smith, supra note 3, at 329.
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Of course, some requested modifications will no doubt be patently unrea-
sonable. Dean Frakt of Widener reports having received a request that a learn-
ing disabled student receive an automatic fifteen percent bonus on all test
scores. 148 While enterprising students will no doubt continue to request such
creative accommodations, schools should measure all requests using the
guidelines described above and should not hesitate to deny those for which
students cannot document a specific need.
C. Extracurricular accommodations
The obligation of postsecondary schools not to discriminate against the dis-
abled in their programs or activities extends to extracurricular activities. 149
Thus, universities have a duty to insure that disabled students can participate
fully in programs such as a roommate assignment pool 150 or an externship. 151
This duty may include taking affirmative steps reasonably to accommodate a
student participating in an extracurricular activity. The OCR has held that San
Jose State University had a duty to train employees of an agency that provided
an externship to the school's students so that such employees could deal effec-
tively with disabled students. The OCR noted that "the University had a re-
sponsibility for providing guidance to the [extemship supervisor] regarding the
provision of academic adjustments or accommodations for students with learn-
ing disabilities. The University's failure to provide such guidance and over-
sight denied the complainant a meaningful opportunity to participate." 152 The
complainant in this matter suffered from dyslexia and visual processing
problems. His externship involved the use of a computer, but his supervisor
would not allow him to use the same computer consistently, and he had diffi-
culty mastering new keyboards. In addition, the supervisor did not allow the
complainant to work at home, where he could have used an optical scanner to
alleviate some of his difficulties related to computer use. The OCR noted that
these problems could have been avoided had the university provided some ad-
vance guidance and training to the supervisor. 153
In the law school context, common extracurricular activities include moot
court programs and law review. 154 Presumably, the same types of accommo-
148. Frakt, supra note 32 at A20.
149. 34 C.F.R. § 104.43(a) (schools may not discriminate on the basis of disability in any "extracurric-
ular, or other postsecondary education program or activity").
150. Coleman v. Zatechka, 824 F.Supp. 1360 (D. Neb. 1993).
151. San Jose State Univ., 4 NDLR 358 (1993) (OCR Letter of Finding).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. In moot court competitions, students draft written arguments and present them orally to judges
who select winners based upon exhibited advocacy skills. Law reviews are prestigious, student-edited jour-
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dations that may be required with respect to academic courses would be re-
quired with respect to these activities. However, because potential legal
employers perceive success in moot court and participation in law review as
having a significant cachet, these activities present special fairness concerns
when it comes to the provision of accommodations. One can readily imagine
the reaction of students who learn that the person who beat them out in the law
review's write-on competition 155 received double time to complete the re-
quired draft. Of course, neither the ADA nor the Rehabilitation Act tell law
school administrators how to handle this type of inevitable backlash. At pre-
sent, the only guidance in this area comes by analogy from the decisions in-
volving course accommodations. Thus, if a school can show that a requested
accommodation would fundamentally alter the nature of its moot court or law
review competition, it could deny the accommodation and shortcut the back-
lash problem. If the requested accommodation would not so alter the competi-
tion, then the backlash is presumably less legitimate.
VI. The Accommodations Gap: Differences Between Academic
and Professional Settings
While learning disabled law students can potentially receive a wide variety
of accommodations in law school, these accommodations are not always avail-
able in law practice. It is easy enough for a professor to allow a student double
time on an examination or a paper, but would a judge allow double time to a
lawyer to submit a brief, even if the lawyer were bold enough to request it?
And even if judges and legal employers did allow learning disabled practition-
ers extra time, could that time be billed to the client? Certainly, the transition
from student to practitioner presents a new and more difficult set of issues for
the learning disabled, and the law at present gives little guidance in this area.
All areas of law practice make certain demands on practitioners' skills; it is
important that all lawyers be able to read carefully and critically, write pre-
cisely and clearly, communicate effectively, and reason logically. These tasks
can be accomplished with or without accommodations, but the extent to which
accommodations are feasible in law practice is limited, and the law requires
nals publishing academic articles on legal issues. Student editors normally acquire their positions by earning
grades that place them in the top 10% of their class or by winning an essay competition judged by current
editors. Success in moot court competitions and membership on a law journal staff can both be tickets to
high-paying legal jobs after law school.
155. Most law reviews select a small percentage of student editors through a write-on competition in
which students draft an analytical essay in response to a complex legal problem. Because law reviews typi-
cally invite only one or two people to become editors through this process each year, the competition is
usually fierce.
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employers to provide only those accommodations that are "reasonable" and do
not cause "undue hardship." 156 A court will consider the cost of an accommo-
dation in assessing whether it would cause "undue hardship," 157 and thus
some costly accommodations may not be required in the workplace, even
though they may have been available in school. Therefore, learning disabled
law students may have to self-accommodate to a greater degree in practice
than in school.
Although the technology that had helped learning disabled law students in
school may be available in practice, it does not come without a cost. Programs
such as spellcheckers and grammar checkers can make editing easier, and
tools such as dictaphones and photoenlargers can allow lawyers to produce
and read documents more efficiently. However, these technological advances
also raise expectations regarding the amount and quality of a lawyer's work.
Because technology makes it easy to produce documents, there are more inter-
office memos, letters, and filings for the average lawyer to read. 158 In addition,
lawyers are now expected to generate documents more quickly, and proofread-
ing errors are less forgivable. Further, with pressures on firms to downsize,
productivity demands on individual attorneys increase even further. 159
The Bar Association of San Francisco has noted a number of accommoda-
tions that legal employers can make in order to help learning disabled employ-
ees meet these rising expectations. 160 In addition to the technological aids
above, the employer can provide flexible scheduling and a quiet workspace. 161
Further, allowing attorneys to tape record meetings or take notes on a laptop
can help those with auditory or writing processing problems. 162 Of course,
tape recorders may be inappropriate in client meetings and other sensitive con-
ferences. The Bar Association also suggests that, when asking learning dis-
abled attorneys to scan documents, employers tab designated pages in
advance. 163 However, having an additional employee going through the pages
in advance presumably defeats the purpose of having the attorney scan them.
156. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9 (1995) (regulations implementing Title I of the ADA).
157. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p) (defining "undue hardship" as "difficulty or expense" incurred by em-
ployer, considering employer's financial resources and operations).
158. See Dale S. Brown & Paul Gerber, Employing People with Learning Disabilities, in LEARNING
DISABILITIES IN ADULTHOOD: PERSISTING PROBLEMS AND EVOLVING ISSUES, supra note 3, at 194, 197.
159. Id.
160. The Bar Association of San Francisco, Report and Model Guidelines for Integration into the Le-
gal Profession of Law Students and Attorneys with Disabilities (1994) (available from the Bar Association
of San Francisco (415-764-1600)).
161. Id. at 9.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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Even the more feasible accommodations listed above are not without
problems. All employees, whether or not disabled, desire quiet space, the best
possible technological equipment, extra clerical help, and flexible hours.
Therefore, a request for this type of help, coming from someone with an invis-
ible disability, may be resented as an unwarranted demand for special treat-
ment. 164 Moreover, in making such a request, an attorney must decide whether
to disclose his or her disability, and this decision is fraught with difficulties.
While disclosure may facilitate better employer-employee relations and lead to
effective accommodation, it may also lead to lowered expectations, retaliation,
and fewer chances for advancement. 165
Law schools should alert their learning disabled students to potential diffi-
culties in practice by giving them a realistic picture of the demands of law
practice and the feasibility (or unfeasibility) of various accommodations in the
practice setting. Schools do their students a disservice by allowing them to
become dependent upon accommodations such as extra time that will not al-
ways be available in practice. As one learning disabled graduate, interviewed
by Stephen T. Murphy, noted, "I thought [school] was the big hurdle. But it
turns out it isn't.... I really don't see that I'm ever going to eliminate the fact
that I take twice as long to do things as other people." 166 This student would
have been better served had he received counseling, before graduation, from
someone like Paul Grossman, the OCR attorney described in Part II above. He
acknowledges that he has to work on weekends, holidays, and over vaca-
tions. 167 He does so willingly, however, because he loves his work. 168 Simi-
larly, many learning disabled law students succeed academically simply by
studying longer and more intensely than their classmates. 169 Of course, in law
practice, in which the average non-disabled practitioner already works long
hours, it is extremely demanding to self-accommodate in this way. Thus, stu-
164. See Brown & Gerber, supra note 156, at 198.
165. PAMELA B. ADELMAN & CAROL T. WREN, LEARNING DISABILITIES, GRADUATE SCHOOL, AND CA-
REERS 31 (1993). In response to a survey designed by Runyan & Smith, a learning disabled attorney noted,
My learning disability is a well-kept secret. I only tell other people about it when there is no
alternative. When I have been forced to disclose my learning disability, I have been met by
disbelief or outright hostility. People think you are ... a mental defective who should be
avoided.
Runyan & Smith, supra note 3, at 338.
166. Murphy, supra note 2, at 102.
167. Remarks by Paul D. Grossman, supra note 37. See also Runyan & Smith, supra note 3, at 335-40
(interviews with two learning disabled lawyers both of whom put in extra time at work to compensate for
their disabilities).
168. Remarks by Paul D. Grossman, supra note 37.
169. See, e.g., John Marshall, Pro Se, STUDENT LAW., Feb. 1989, at 18 (Feb. 1989) (describing the
author's experiences as a learning disabled law student at Brigham Young University).
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dents preparing for practice should be counseled that the demands on their
time in practice will be even greater than those in law school.
Further, one way to do more than simply warn learning disabled law stu-
dents that practice will be tougher than school is to counsel them to choose a
career or practice area that capitalizes on their strengths and minimizes their
weaknesses. Those who have difficulty writing and preparing arguments under
deadline pressure will probably not want to become litigators. Those who have
strong interpersonal skills could opt for a counseling-oriented practice, and
those who have disabilities that affect face-to-face interaction may be success-
ful researchers and brief-writers. So long as the learning disabled practitioner
is able to perform the essential functions of the chosen practice style, she has
the potential to succeed as a lawyer. If a practitioner is unable to perform so-
called "essential functions" with or without "reasonable" accommodations, she
is not a "qualified" employee under the ADA and cannot benefit from its
protections. 170
Ultimately, the goal of a school's disability services program should be a
weaning away from reliance on accommodation, to the extent possible, so that
students will be ready to self-accommodate if necessary in practice. In addi-
tion, schools should give students as much first-hand experience as possible so
that students have some direct knowledge of whether and how they will be
able to adapt themselves to various practice settings. Because learning dis-
abled students may set unrealistic goals for themselves, 171 counseling and ex-
posure is particularly important in allowing students to develop realistic goals.
Indeed, students need frank counseling at the secondary and university levels
about whether law school itself is a wise choice, given their disabilities and
skill levels. Counseling, which would give prospective applicants a realistic
view of their prospects for success in school and in practice, would probably
shortcut many problems presently encountered by learning disabled law stu-
dents. If students enter law school with a realistic picture of the standards to
which school and practice will hold them, they will have more time and moti-
170. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (preventing discrimination against only "qualified" individuals with disabil-
ities); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (defining "qualified" individual as one who can perform "essential functions"
of employment). No federal court has decided what duties constitute the "essential functions" of law
practice.
171. Esther H. Minskoff, Post-Secondary Education and Vocational Training: Keys to Success for
Adults with Learning Disabilities, in LEARNING DISABILITIES IN ADULTHOOD: PERSISTING PROBLEMS AND
EVOLVING ISSUES, supra note 3, at 11, 117. One of Stephen T. Murphy's interview subjects apparently
made an unrealistic choice, given her disabilities, to become a secretary. She reports: "I have trouble taking
messages correctly. Typing is a problem, speed is a big issue, and doing things under pressure." Murphy,
supra note 2, at 113. A bank teller Murphy interviewed seems to have made a similarly unwise choice: "I
had a lot of shortages and none of the people would help me find them ... I don't know why I got fired.
They said because I had too many shortages, but I know for a fact it had to be more than that." Id. at 107.
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vation to learn to self-accommodate. Thus, upon graduation, they will be more
likely to become satisfied, productive professionals.

